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Abstract
We study a model of tax competition between two countries when both skilled
and unskilled workers make their migration decisions simultaneously and wages are
endogenously determined. If both factors of production are allowed to migrate
freely and when the demand for skilled labor is not so elastic, the problem typically
predicted in the literature of tax competition that increased mobility of production
factors will pose a severe threat to redistribution possibility is less acute than it
might first appear. The equilibrium tax rate can be not only positive but also
increasing in the degree of mobility of unskilled workers. This is mainly because an
initial change in migration flows induced by an increase in the tax rate brings about
a higher wage for skilled workers and a lower wage for unskilled workers, which
offsets the initial adverse effect. We also show that in contrast to the conventional
wisdom in the literature of tax competition decreasing the tax rate invites not only
skilled workers but also unskilled workers; unskilled workers always chase skilled
workers at the equilibrium.
JEL Categories: D50, F21, H30
Keywords: globalization, mobility, tax competition, redistribution, fiscal ex-
ternality, political economy
1 Introduction
In almost all countries, personal and household wealth and income are distributed
quite unequally, and fiscal authorities are redistributing income and wealth through
various fiscal policies. But there is a growing concern that in a globalized world
where production factors freely move across the borders, the capacity of redistribu-
tive fiscal policies is quite limited, even by a government caring about the welfare of
the poor, because redistribution may attract welfare recipients (the poor or unskilled
workers) while pushing out sources of the tax base (the rich or skilled workers). (See
Epple and Romer (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1992), Rodrik (1997), and Roemer
(1997) among others.) Tax competition between fiscal authorities drives the tax
rate down because fiscal authorities are playing a Bertrand-type price competition
game where each fiscal authority can be better off by undercutting the tax rate of
its opponent.
The current paper reexamines the conventional wisdom in the literature of factor
mobility and tax competition, using a general equilibrium model with production
and free mobility of two production factors — skilled and unskilled labor. We will
show that the so-called ‘race to the neoliberal bottom’ thesis may not hold when the
mobility of both unskilled and skilled workers are considered simultaneously, and
immigranats and natives are treated equally in being taxed and receiving benefits.
Under the equal treatment principle, the skilled and unskilled workers always move
in the same direction. Consequently the exit threat imposed by the rich on the
tax-raising country is offset by a countervailing threat imposed by the poor on the
tax-undercutting country. Unless the demand for skilled labor is sufficiently elastic,
the equilibrium tax rate is not only positive but also increasing in the degree of
mobility of unskilled workers.1
2 The model
There are two countries located in a unit circle. The distance between the two
countries in the circle is 1/2 in either direction so that the two countries are located
1The supply of skilled labor is in general elastic, but the demand for skilled labor may be
inelastic.
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exactly in the opposite. The Salopian (1979) model specification adopted here is
qualitatively identical to the Hotelling’s (1929) linear space model when there are
only two countries.
There are two types of workers in the world: skilled (S) and unskilled (U) work-
ers.2 For any type θ ∈ {U, S}, workers are uniformly distributed around the circle
and provide eθ efficiency units of labor inelastically. We assume that eU = 1 and
eS = e > 1. The mass of each type of workers is given bymθ, so the total mass of the
world population is mU +mS. We assume that mU = 1 and mS = m < 1; unskilled
workers outnumber skilled workers. Within each type, there is no ability difference
between workers; workers within each type are all identical in the efficiency units of
labor they can deliver.
A worker of type-θ who travels distance zθ to work in a country incurs a total
travel cost of dθzθ, where dθ > 0 is a unit travel cost. The travel cost does not have
to be strictly interpreted as a monetary cost. It can be either a worker’s dislike for
country i or uncertainty that she attaches to the labor market of country i. Due to
the presence of the travel cost, workers are imperfectly mobile; even if the post-fisc
incomes are smaller in country i, a worker with small dθzθ may still want to migrate
into country i.
We interpret the inverse of dθ as the degree of mobility of type-θ workers; a
worker is more mobile when she incurs a lower travel cost in moving across the
border. We assume dS ≤ dU , so that skilled workers are more mobile than unskilled
workers. When dθ = ∞, workers of type θ are perfectly immobile. As dθ → 0, on
the other hand, the mobility of type-θ workers approaches to a perfect one.
Consider a type-θ worker who is located between countries 1 and 2 in one side of
the circle at distance zθ from country 1 and 1
2
− zθ from country 2. If her post-fisc
income from country 1 is yθ1 and the post-fisc income from country 2 is y
θ
2, then she
chooses to migrate into country 1 when
yθ1 − dθzθ > yθ2 − dθ(
1
2
− zθ), (1)
2Although we develop a model in terms of unskilled and skilled labor, our model is directly
applicable to the situation where labor and capital are production factors; we only need to rename
the two production factors.
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or equivalently
zθ < ezθ = 1
4
+
yθ1 − yθ2
2dθ
. (2)
The cutoff point ezθ lies in the interior when ¯¯yθ1 − yθ2 ¯¯ ≤ dθ/2.
Because there is an identical set of workers (for each type) on the other side of
the circle, the total labor supply of type-θ workers for country 1 is
Λθ1 = m
θeθ
µ
1
2
+
yθ1 − yθ2
dθ
¶
. (3)
Since the total supply of type-θ workers in the world is mθeθ, the labor supply of
type-θ workers for country 2 is
Λθ2 = m
θeθ
µ
1
2
+
yθ2 − yθ1
dθ
¶
. (4)
Each country produces a single product, called ‘output’ or ‘income,’ according
to a constant returns to scale production function Gi(LSi , L
U
i ). We normalize the
price of the output as 1, and assume that the function Gi enjoys the usual properties
of the neoclassical CRS production functions, such as diminishing returns. For a
CRS production function, only the ratio of the two production factors matters, so
we define gi(vi) ≡ Gi(vi, 1), where vi ≡ LSi /LUi . We assume the following regarding
the functions gi(.).
Assumption 1 For all i = 1, 2, gi(vi) is continuous, increasing, concave, and twice-
differentiable.
Labor markets in each country are Walrasian, so that wage rates for each type
of workers are determined by their marginal productivity. The profit maximization
condition in each country yields
wSi = g
0
i(vi), (5)
and
wUi = φi(vi), (6)
where g
0
i(vi) is the derivative of gi(vi) and φi(vi) = gi(vi)−vig
0
i(vi). The concavity of
gi(.) implies that the wage rate of unskilled workers is nondecreasing in v and that
of skilled workers is nonincreasing in v. Intuitively, an increase in v increases the
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marginal productivity of unskilled workers and decreases the marginal productivity
of skilled workers. Since g
0
i(vi) is the demand function for skilled labor, we define
the elasticity of demand for skilled labor as εi(vi) ≡ −g
00
i (vi)vi/g
0
i(vi) ≥ 0.
The labor market equilibrium condition that labor supply must equal to labor
demand for each type of labor yields
vi =
ΛSi
ΛUi
= k
1/2 +
¡
ySi − ySj
¢
/dS
1/2 +
¡
yUi − yUj )
¢
/dU
, (7)
where k = m
SeS
mUeU
= me.
The government of each country imposes taxes on skilled workers according to
a tax function τ i(.) and provides transfer payments to unskilled workers according
to a transfer function Ti(.) under a balanced budget constraint. Hence the post-fisc
income of a skilled worker is
ySi = w
S
i e− τ i(wSi e), (8)
and that of a unskilled worker is
yUi = w
U
i + Ti(w
U
i ). (9)
We assume that the government never levies taxes greater than wages; wSi e −
τ i(wSi e) ≥ 0. This condition is indeed an incentive compatibility condition for skilled
workers; otherwise skilled workers will not work.
In the literature of tax competition, many forms of tax and transfer functions
have been studied. Some models study tax competition by assuming that ySi =
wSi e− τ i and yUi = wUi + T i, where T i is lump-sum benefits whereas τ i is lump-sum
taxes. Others have studied with ySi = (1 − ti)wSi e and yUi = (1 + si)wUi , where
si ∈ [0, 1] is the proportional subsidy rate whereas ti ∈ [0, 1] is the proportional tax
rate. All these models can be succinctly covered by the following forms of tax and
transfer functions:
Ti(w
U
i ) = β0Ti + (1− β0)siwUi , (10)
τ i(wSi e) = β1τ i + (1− β1)tiwSi e. (11)
If β0 = β1 = 1, then ySi = wSi e−τ i and yUi = wUi +T i; hence lump-sum transfers
are financed through lump-sum taxes. If β0 = β1 = 0, then ySi = (1 − ti)wSi e and
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yUi = (1 + si)w
U
i , so that the fiscal policy is implemented by proportional taxes
and subsidies. If β0 = 0 and β1 = 1, then ySi = wSi e − τ i and yUi = (1 + si)wUi ;
proportional subsides are financed by lump-sum taxes. Finally if β0 = 1 and β1 = 0,
then lump-sum transfers are financed by proportional taxation. Although other
combinations are possible, the present paper focuses mainly on the above-mentioned
four cases.3 Hence we assume Ti ∈ {Ti, siwUi } and τ i ∈ {τ i, tiwSi e}, where si, ti ∈
[0, 1] and τ i, T i lie in some nonnegative compact intervals.4 Note that these four
cases are qualitatively all identical when wθi is exogenously given. In the model of
tax competition, the policy variable is either τ i or ti. We denote the policy variable
of country i by pi; hence pi ∈ {τ i, ti}.
Because the government budget is balanced, we must have
TiΛ
U
i = τ iΛSi /e. (12)
The term ΛUi is the total number of unskilled workers in country i, whereas Λ
S
i /e is
the total number of skilled workers. Note that this relationship holds whatever the
forms of the tax and transfer functions.
Substituting equations (8) and (9) into (7) and using (5), (6), and the relationship
Ti = τ ivi/e, we obtain the following system of two equations: for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i
vi = k
1/2 +
¡
(g
0
i(vi)e− τ i)− (g
0
j(vj)e− τ j)
¢
/dS
1/2 +
¡
(φi(vi) + τ ivi/e)− (φj(vj) + τ jvj/e)
¢
/dU
, (13)
where τ i ∈ {τ i, tiwSi e}. Note that what matters in the model of tax competition is
the form of the tax function; the form of the transfer function is irrelevant. Hence
we need to study only two cases, depending on the form of the tax function.
3Some models take the form of yθi = (1 − ai)wθeθ + bi, where ai ∈ [0, 1] and bi ≥ 0. This
case can be easily studied in our framework if we allow τ i and si to take negative values. By
setting β0 = β1 = 12 , T i = −τ i = 2bi, and −si = ti = 2ai, we have Ti = bi − aiwUi and
τ i = −bi + aiwSi e. The budget balance equation yields bi = evi+e (w
U
i + w
S
i vi)ai and therefore
τ i = −bi + aiwSi e = ai(g
0
ie − ev+e (φi + g
0
ivi)). Computation of the equilbirum with this τ i is
starightforward. Although we do not report here, the equilibrium tax rate depends again on the
elasticity of labor demands for skilled workers.
4The fact that τ i, T i lie in compact intervals is a corrolary of our assumption that taxes cannot
be greater than wages.
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The system of equations (13) determines a vector v = (v1, v2) given parameters
Θ = (k, dS, dU , e) and tax policies p =(p1, p2). By construction, the right hand
side expression of equation (13), Λ
S
i
ΛUi
, is never less than zero. Hence vi ≥ 0. Each
equation is well-defined if ΛUi 6= 0. The solution to the above system of equations, if
exists, will be a function of a policy vector p = (p1, p2) and other parameter values
Θ.
In each country the tax policy is determined by maximizing the weighted aver-
age of the post-incomes of unskilled and skilled workers; that is, the social welfare
function in each country is given by
Wi(p) = αi(wUi (vi(p)) + τ i(p)vi(p)/e) + (1− αi)(wSi (vi(p))e− τ i(p)), (14)
where τ i(p) ∈ {τ i, tiwSi (vi(t))e}.5 The coefficient αi ∈ [0, 1]measures the bargaining
power of unskilled workers. If αi = 0, then the government in country i reflects only
the interest of skilled workers. If αi = 1, then the government in country i reflects
only the interest of unskilled workers. We do not model how the bargaining power
between the two types of workers is determined in each country.
We completed the description of our model. We now define an equilibrium
concept that we will employ in the current paper.
Definition 2 Suppose vi(p1, p2) is a solution of the equation system given by (13).
An equilibrium is a policy vector (p∗1, p∗2), a vector of the ratio of the two types
of workers (v∗1, v
∗
2), and vectors of equilibrium wage rates (w
∗θ
1 , w
∗θ
2 ) for θ ∈ {U, S}
such that for all i = 1, 2 and j6= i
p∗i ∈ argmax
pi
Wi(pi, p
∗
j),
v∗i = vi(p
∗
i , p
∗
j),
w∗Ui = φ(v∗i ),
w∗Si = g
0
(v∗i ).
Hence each worker chooses a country based on her rationally anticipated policy
position that each country will take, and each country sets the policy based on its
rational expectation about migration flows.
5Alternatively, one can specify the social welfare function as a Nash product. Our result is
qualitatively invariant to this alternative specification.
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It is in general difficult to obtain a closed-form solution for the system of equa-
tions (13) even with a very simple production function. Because of this, we will
apply the implicit function theorem in the analysis. We first establish the formula
for ∂vi∂pi and
∂vi
∂pj , which will be repeatedly used in the following analysis.
Theorem 3 Let τ i ∈ {τ i, tig0ie} be the tax function and pi ∈ {τ i, ti} the policy
instrument of country i. Let
Ai = Λ
U
i −
vi
dU
(vig
00
i (vi)−
∂(τ ivi/e)
∂vi
)− k
dS
(g
00
i (vi)e−
∂τ i
∂vi
),
ΛUi =
1
2
+ (φi(vi) + τ ivi − φj(vj)− τ jvj)/dU , j 6= i,
Bi =
vi
dU
(vjg
00
j (vj)−
∂(τ jvj/e)
∂vj
) +
k
dS
(g
00
j (vi)e−
∂τ j
∂vj
), j 6= i,
Dii = (
vi
dU
vi
e
+
k
dS
)
∂τ i
∂pi
,
Dij = −(
vi
dU
vj
e
+
k
dS
)
∂τ j
∂pj
, j 6= i.
Then for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i
∂vi
∂pi
=
−1
|K|(AjDii −BiDji),
∂vi
∂pj
=
−1
|K|(AjDij −BiDjj),
where |K| = A1A2 −B1B2.
Proof. The two equations from (13) are
vi = k
1
2
+
¡
(g
0
i(vi)e− τ i)− (g
0
j(vj)e− τ j)
¢
/dS
1
2
+
¡
(φi(vi) + τ ivi/e)− (φj(vj) + τ jvj/e)
¢
/dU
,
vj = k
1
2
+
¡
(g
0
j(vj)e− τ j)− (g
0
i(vi)e− τ i)
¢
/dS
1
2
+
¡
(φj(vj) + τ jvj/e)− (φi(vi) + τ ivi/e)
¢
/dU
,
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Differentiation of the above two equations with respect to pi
yields
Ai
∂vi
∂pi
+Bi
∂vj
∂pi
+Dii = 0,
Bj
∂vi
∂pi
+Aj
∂vj
∂pi
+Dji = 0.
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Solving simultaneously, we have"
∂vi
∂pi
∂vj
∂pi
#
= −
"
Ai Bi
Bj Aj
#−1 "
Dii
Dji
#
= − 1|K|
"
Aj −Bi
−Bj Ai
#"
Dii
Dji
#
,
which completes the proof. ( ∂vi∂pj is obtained by reversing i and j from
∂vj
∂pi .)
Remark 4 For the sake of later computations, we derive the various variables ap-
peared in Theorem 3.
(1) If τ i = tig
0
ie and pi = ti, then
∂(τ ivi/e)
∂vi = ti(g
0
i+g
00
i vi) = tig
0
i(1−εi), ∂τ i∂vi = tig
00
i e,
and ∂τ i∂pi = g
0
ie. Hence Ai = Λ
U
i +
vi
dU
(εi+(1−εi)ti)g
0
i+
e
dS
k
vi
(1−ti)εig
0
i, Bi = − vidU (εj+
(1− εj)tj)g
0
j − edS
k
vj
(1− tj)εjg
0
j, Dii = (
vi
dU
vi
e
+ k
dS
)g
0
ie and Dij = −( vidU
vj
e
+ k
dS
)g
0
je for
j 6= i.
(2) If τ i = τ i and pi = τ i, then ∂(τ ivi/e)∂vi = τ i/e ,
∂τ i
∂vi = 0, and
∂τ i
∂pi = 1. Hence
Ai = Λ
U
i − vidU (vig
00
i −τ i/e)− kdS g
00
i (vi)e, Bi =
vi
dU
(vjg
00
j−τ j/e)+ kdS g
00
j e, Dii = (
vi
dU
vi
e
+ k
dS
)
and Dij = −( vidU
vj
e
+ k
dS
) for j 6= i.
3 Tax competition with identical countries
To obtain analytically tractable results, we will mainly study the symmetric equi-
librium under the assumption that the two countries are identical. Elsewhere we
showed by simulations that the qualitative results derived from the symmetric equi-
librium carry over to asymmetric cases (Lee, 2003). Also to see the intuition behind
the model more clearly, we will study with the two extreme forms of the social wel-
fare function, corresponding to αi = 1 and αi = 0. Analysis of the intermediate
cases is straightforward. We first compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium when
the policy instrument is a proportional tax rate.
Theorem 5 Suppose αi = 1 and gi() = g(.) for all i. Suppose the policy instrument
of each country is a proportional tax rate ti. Then the equilibrium tax rate at the
symmetric equilibrium is
t∗i =



1 if 1
2g0 +
k
dU
≥ e
dS
1
2g
0 +( kdU +
e
dS
)ε
( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε+( e
dS
− k
dU
)
if 1
2g
0 + kdU <
e
dS
,
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where ε is evaluated at k. The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in 1
dU
if ε−1ε <
4g
0
e
dS
;
otherwise it is decreasing in 1
dU
. The equilibrium tax rate is always decreasing in 1
dS
.
Proof. At the symmetric equilibrium, we must have εi = ε, ti = t, ΛUi = 12 ,
ΛSi =
k
2
, vi = k, Bi = B = − kdU (ε + (1 − ε)t)g
0 − e
dS
(1 − t)εg0, Ai = A = 12 − B,
and Dii = −Dij = kg
0
(k)( k
dU
+ e
dS
). (See Remark 4-(1).) Therefore from Theorem
3 we compute |K| = A2 − B2 = 1
4
− B = 1
4
+ (1 − t)( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0 + t k
dU
g
0
> 0 and
∂vi
∂ti =
−1
|K|(A+B)Dii =
−kg0
2|K| (
k
dU
+ e
dS
). Now
∂Wi|αi=1
∂ti
= (φ0i + tig
00
i vi + tig
0
i)
∂vi
∂ti
+ g
0
ivi
=
µ
(ε+ (1− ε)t)
µ
−kg0
2 |K|(
k
dU
+
e
dS
)
¶
+ k
¶
g
0
=
kg
0
2 |K|
µ
−(ε+ (1− ε)t)( k
dU
+
e
dS
)g
0
+ 2 |K|
¶
=
k(g
0
)2
2 |K|
µµ
1
2g0
+ (
k
dU
+
e
dS
)ε
¶
− t
µ
ε( k
dU
+
e
dS
)− ( k
dU
− e
dS
)
¶¶
.
The term
¡
ε( k
dU
+ e
dS
)− ( k
dU
− e
dS
)
¢
is positive since k
dU
= me
dU
< e
dS
. Hence ∂Wi∂ti is
positive up to
1
2g
0 +( kdU +
e
dS
)ε
( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε+( e
dS
− k
dU
)
and then negative. If
1
2g
0 +( kdU +
e
dS
)ε
( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε+( e
dS
− k
dU
)
is less than
1, then it is the interior equilibrium tax rate; otherwise the equilibrium tax rate is
1 because ∂Wi∂ti > 0 for all ti.
Differentiation of t∗i with respect to
1
dU
yields
∂t∗i
∂( 1
dU
)
=
k(2ε e
dS
− (ε− 1) 1
2g0 )¡
( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε+ ( e
dS
− k
dU
)
¢2 .
This is positive if ε−1ε <
4g
0
e
dS
.
Similarly, differentiation of t∗i with respect to
1
dS
yields
∂t∗i
∂( 1
dS
)
=
−e(2ε k
dU
+ ε+1
2g0 )¡
( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε+ ( e
dS
− k
dU
)
¢2 < 0,
which completes the proof.
Several remarks can be made regarding Theorem 5.
First, since ε−1ε is increasing in ε ≥ 0, our result implies that the equilibrium
tax rate is increasing in the mobility of unskilled workers if the labor demand for
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skilled workers is not so elastic. In particular, if ε = 0, then the equilibrium tax rate
is always increasing in the mobility of unskilled workers. If the demand for skilled
labor is very elastic, on the other hand, the tax rate decreases as unskilled workers
become more mobile. Note that when ε ≤ 1, the inequality ε−1ε <
4g
0
e
dS
always holds,
so the turning point value of ε is greater than 1.
Second, the equilibrium tax rate when unskilled workers are perfectly immo-
bile (dU = ∞) becomes t∗i |dU=∞ = min[
1
2g
0 +ε( edS )
(ε+1) e
dS
, 1], and therefore the tax rate is
decreasing in 1
dS
. This result is consistent with the standard result that a higher
mobility of skilled workers lowers the equilibrium tax rate. On the other hand, if
skilled workers are perfectly immobile (dS = ∞) while only unskilled workers are
mobile, then the equilibrium tax rate becomes t∗i |dS=∞ = 1, because 12g0 + kdU ≥ edS
when dS = ∞. This is due to the fact that the governments are caring only about
unskilled workers.
Third, it is straightforward to verify that t∗i |dU=∞ < t∗i ≤ t∗i |dS=∞.
Our results therefore are very different from the results derived from the models
that consider the mobility of only one production factor. In particular, the mobility
of unskilled workers offsets the adverse effect of the mobility of skilled workers on
the tax rate. What is the intuition behind our results then? To better understand
Theorem 5, we derive Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 Suppose αi = α and gi() = g(.) for all i. If the policy instrument of each
country is a proportional tax rate, then at the symmetric equilibrium the following
results hold.
(1)∂vi∂ti =
−k
2|K|(
k
dU
+ e
dS
)g
0
< 0, where |K| = 1
4
+ (1− t)( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0 + t k
dU
g
0
> 0;
(2)∂vi∂tj = −
∂vi
∂ti > 0;
(3) ∂Λ
S
i
∂ti =
−ke
|K|dS (
1
4
+ ktg
0
dU
)g
0
< 0; and
(4) ∂Λ
U
i
∂ti =
k
|K|dU (
1
4
− tg
0
e
dS
)g
0 ≶ 0 if 1
4
≶ tg0e
dS
.
Proof. We already derived part (1) in Theorem 5. Part (2) is straightforward
because Dii = −Dij at the symmetric equilibrium. To prove part (3), note that
ΛSi = k(
1
2
+
(g
0
i(vi)e−τ i)−(g
0
j(vj)e−τj)
dS
), where τ i = tig
0
ie. Hence
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∂ΛSi
∂ti
=
k
dS
µ
(1− ti)g
00
i e
∂vi
∂ti
− (1− tj)g
00
j e
∂vj
∂ti
− g0ie
¶
=
k
dS
(2(1− t)g00e∂vi
∂ti
− g0e)
=
k
dS
µ
2(1− t)g00e( −k
2 |K|(
k
dU
+
e
dS
)g
0
)− g0e
¶
=
−k
dS |K|
µ
−(1− t)( k
dU
+
e
dS
)εg0 + |K|
¶
g
0
e
=
−ke
|K| dS (
1
4
+
ktg
0
dU
)g
0
< 0.
Since vi =
ΛSi
ΛUi
, we have ∂vi∂ti =
∂ΛSi
∂ti (
1
ΛUi
)− viΛUi
∂ΛUi
∂ti . At the symmetric equilibrium
1
ΛUi
= 2 and viΛUi
= 2k. Hence ∂Λ
U
i
∂ti =
1
k
∂ΛSi
∂ti −
1
2k
∂vi
∂ti =
k
|K|dU (
1
4
− tg
0
e
dS
)g
0
, which completes
the proof.
The first part of Lemma 6 states that as country i increases the tax rate, the
ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers (v) falls. One might intuitively think
that this is due to the emigration of skilled workers from the tax-increasing country
plus the immigration of unskilled workers to that country. But parts (3) and (4) of
Lemma 6 shows that this intuition is not always true. Part (3) shows that skilled
workers always migrate out as the tax rate increases. Part (4) of Lemma 6 shows,
however, that the migration flow of unskilled workers depends on the tax rate and
the degree of mobility of skilled workers. If the tax rate is sufficiently low or skilled
workers are not so mobile (that is, if t/dS is sufficiently low), then unskilled workers
migrate in to the tax-increasing country (∂Λ
U
i
∂ti > 0). If the tax rate is sufficiently
high or skilled workers are sufficiently mobile, however, unskilled workers migrate
out from the tax-increasing country (∂Λ
U
i
∂ti < 0). What this means is that under
certain circumstances skilled and unskilled workers can move in the same direction.
The intuition behind this result can be obtained by looking at the post-fisc
income of unskilled workers. The first effect of an increase in the tax rate is, by
increasing the transfer payment through the tax rate effect, to increase the number
of unskilled workers and reduce the number of skilled workers. This first effect
reduces v, and so increases wS. Intuitively, a decrease in the supply of skilled workers
increases the wage rate for them. Therefore the effect of an increase in the tax rate
on the tax base — which is equal to wSi vi— is ambiguous. Furthermore, w
U declines as
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the number of unskilled workers increases. The combination of the wage rate effect
and the tax base effect induced by the first effect provides an opposite incentive
for unskilled workers. If skilled workers are not so mobile or the tax rate is not
high, then the second combined effects will be smaller than the first effect, so that
unskilled workers continue to come in. But if skilled workers are sufficiently mobile
or the tax rate is high, then the combined effects will dominate the tax rate effect,
so that unskilled workers, looking for higher wages and higher tax bases, will chase
skilled workers wherever the latter go.
Indeed this is what happens at the equilibrium. To see this, we compute
1
4
− t
∗g
0
e
dS
=
4ε( k
dU
+ e
dS
)(1
4
− g
0
e
dS
)− ( e
dS
+ k
dU
)
4(( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε+ ( e
dS
− k
dU
))
< 0, (15)
since (1
4
− g
0
e
dS
) < (1
2
− g
0
e
dS
) < 0 and e
dS
− k
dU
> 0.6 Hence ∂Λ
U
i
∂ti < 0 at the equilibrium,
which implies that increasing the tax rate pushes out not only skilled workers but
also unskilled workers. Our result is therefore sharply in contrast to the conventional
wisdom in tax competition that skilled workers will migrate out whereas unskilled
workers migrate in to the tax-raising country.
The fact that skilled and unskilled workers can move in the same direction has
a dramatic implication for the equilibrium tax rate. When unskilled workers always
chase skilled workers, it is not always the best response of a country to undercut
the tax rate of the other country, because undercutting the tax rate invites not only
skilled workers but also unskilled workers. Hence the undercutting procedure does
not continue forever, which implies that each country can propose a positive tax
rate at the equilibrium even in the world of free mobility.
But the fact that unskilled and skilled workers move together does not auto-
matically imply that an increase in the mobility of unskilled workers increases the
equilibrium tax rate. Although skilled and unskilled workers are moving together
in our model, an increase in the mobility of unskilled workers increases the tax rate
only when the labor demand for skilled workers is not so elastic.
Whether the demand for skilled labor is elastic or inelastic, of course, depends
on a form of the production function. If the production function is that of a CES
type, g(v) = A(γvρ + (1 − γ))1/ρ, where A > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1), and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1), then
6The condition 12−
g
0
e
dS
< 0 is derived from the fact that t∗i ≤ 1, which imples that 12−
g
0
e
dS
≤ −kg
0
dU
.
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the elasticity of labor demand is related with the elasticity of substitution. It is
straightforward to show that at the symmetric equilibrium the elasticity of labor
demand becomes
ε =
(1− ρ)(1− γ)
γkρ + 1− γ . (16)
Therefore ε becomes larger as ρ becomes smaller. If ρ = 1, the production function
is linear and ε = 0. If ρ = 0, the production function is Cobb-Douglas and ε = 1−γ.
Finally if ρ = −∞, then the production function is Leontieff and ε = ∞. Since ρ
is the elasticity of substitution between the two production factors, the elasticity
of demand for skilled labor in the CES production function becomes smaller when
the two production factors are substitutes and larger when the production factors
are complements. Therefore another interpretation of our result is that a higher
mobility of unskilled workers are conducive to a higher tax rate if unskilled and
skilled workers are substitutes. If they are strong complements in production, then
a higher mobility of unskilled workers are more likely to decrease the tax rate.
Whether the two production factors are substitutes or complements is of course an
empirical issue.
When the policy instrument is a lump-sum tax, however, the mobility of unskilled
workers is always conducive to a higher tax rate regardless of the elasticity of labor
demand.
Theorem 7 Suppose αi = 1 and gi() = g(.) for all i. Let the policy instrument of
each country be a lump-sum tax. Then the equilibrium tax rate at the symmetric
equilibrium is
τ ∗i = min[
1
2
+ ( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0
( e
dS
− k
dU
)/e
, g
0
(k)e].
The equilibrium tax rate is always decreasing in 1
dS
and increasing in 1
dU
.
Proof. At the symmetric equilibrium, we have τ i = τ , ΛUi = 12 , Λ
S
i =
k
2
, vi = k,
Bi = B = −( kdU +
e
dS
)εg0 − kτ/e
dU
, Ai = A = 12 − B, Dii = −Dij =
k
e
( k
dU
+ e
dS
). (See
Remark 4-(2).) Therefore Theorem 3 implies that |K| = 1
4
−B = 1
4
+( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0+
13
kτ/e
dU
> 0 and ∂vi∂τ i =
−1
|K|(A+B)Dii =
−1
2|K|
k
e
( k
dU
+ e
dS
). Hence
∂Wi|αi=1
∂τ i
= (φ0i +
τ i
e
)
∂vi
∂τ i
+
vi
e
= (εg0 +
τ
e
)
−1
2 |K|
k
e
(
k
dU
+
e
dS
) +
k
e
=
1
2 |K|
k
e
µ
−(εg0 + τ
e
)(
k
dU
+
e
dS
) + 2 |K|
¶
=
1
2 |K|
k
e
µ
(
1
2
+ (
k
dU
+
e
dS
)εg0)− 1
e
(
e
dS
− k
dU
)τ
¶
.
The term ( e
dS
− k
dU
) is positive. Hence ∂Wi∂τ i is positive up to
1
2
+( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0
( e
dS
− k
dU
)/e
and
then negative. The incentive compatibility condition implies that τ i ≤ g
0
(k)e. If
1
2
+( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0
( e
dS
− k
dU
)/e
is less than g
0
(k)e, then it is the interior equilibrium tax rate; otherwise
the equilibrium tax rate is g
0
(k)e.
Differentiation of τ ∗i with respect to 1dU yields
∂τ ∗i
∂( 1
dU
)
=
k
2e
+ 2k
2
dS
εg0¡
( e
dS
− k
dU
)/e
¢2 > 0.
Similarly, differentiation of τ ∗i with respect to 1dS yields
∂τ ∗i
∂( 1
dS
)
=
−(1
2
+ 2k
dS
εg0)¡
( e
dS
− k
dU
)/e
¢2 < 0,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 7 tells us that the equilibrium tax rate is always increasing in 1
dU
. Hence
when the transfer payments are financed by lump-sum taxes, an increase in the
mobility of unskilled workers always increases the tax rate whatever the elasticity of
demand for skilled workers. This is largely due to the fact that the total tax revenue
τ ivi
e
does not directly depend on wS in the case of lump-sum taxes.
Lemma 8 is a counterpart to Lemma 6 when taxes are lump-sum. The proof of
Lemma 8 is omitted because it is basically the same as the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 8 Suppose αi = α and gi() = g(.) for all i. If the policy instrument of each
country is a lump-sum tax, then at the symmetric equilibrium the following results
hold.
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(1)∂vi∂τ i =
−1
2|K|
k
e
( k
dU
+ e
dS
) < 0, where |K| = 1
4
+ ( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg0 + kτ/e
dU
> 0;
(2) ∂vi∂τj = −
∂vi
∂τ i > 0;
(3) ∂Λ
S
i
∂τ i =
−k
|K|dS (
1
4
+ kτ/e
dU
) < 0; and
(4) ∂Λ
U
i
∂τ i =
1
|K|dU
k
e
(1
4
− τ
dS
) ≶ 0 if 1
4
≶ τ
dS
.
Again at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
1
4
− τ
∗
dS
= −
( e
dS
+ k
dU
)1
e
+ 4( k
dU
+ e
dS
)εg
0
dS
4( e
dS
− k
dU
)1
e
< 0, (17)
so unskilled workers chase skilled workers.
Until now we have studied the model with αi = 1. Next we turn to another
extreme case: αi = 0.
Theorem 9 Suppose αi = 0 and gi() = g(.) for all i. Whether the policy instru-
ment is the proportional tax rate or lump-sum taxes, the equilibrium tax rate at the
symmetric equilibrium is always zero.
Proof. (1) Suppose τ i = tig
0
ie.
∂Wi|αi=0
∂ti
= e(−g0i + (1− ti)g
00
i
∂vi
∂ti
)
= e(−g0 + (1− t)g00
µ
−kg0
2 |K|(
k
dU
+
e
dS
)
¶
)
=
−eg0
2 |K|(2 |K|− (1− t)(
k
dU
+
e
dS
)εg0)
=
e(g
0
)2
2 |K|
µ
−( 1
2g0
+ (
k
dU
+
e
dS
)ε)− t
µ
2k
dU
− ( k
dU
+
e
dS
)ε
¶¶
.
The term −(1
2
+ ( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε) is always negative whereas the sign of the term
2k
dU
− ( k
dU
+ e
dS
)ε is indeterminate. But since sgn∂Wi|αi=0∂ti |ti=1 = sgn(− 12g0 −2 kdU ) < 0,
∂Wi
∂ti is always negative for ti ∈ [0, 1]. Hence the equilibrium tax rate is zero.
(2) Suppose τ i = τ i.
∂Wi|αi=0
∂τ i
= g
00
i e
∂vi
∂τ i
− 1
= g
00
e
−1
2 |K|
k
e
(
k
dU
+
e
dS
)− 1
=
1
2 |K|
µ
(
k
dU
+
e
dS
)εg0 − 2 |K|
¶
=
1
2 |K|
µ
−(1
2
+ (
k
dU
+
e
dS
)εg0)− 2ke
dU
τ
¶
< 0.
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Hence the equilibrium tax rate is zero.
The result is not so surprising. Because skilled workers always lose from a higher
tax rate, if the governments care only about skilled workers, they will set zero tax
rates. Indeed Theorem 9 is a corollary of the fact that the labor supply of skilled
workers is decreasing in the tax rate. To see this, consider the case of a proportional
tax rate. SinceWi|αi=0 = (1−ti)g0ie, ∂Wi|αi=0∂ti = (1−ti)g
00
i e
∂vi
∂ti −g
0
ie. Since Λ
S
i = k(
1
2
+
(1−ti)g
0
i(vi)e−(1−tj)g
0
j(vj)
dS
), we have ∂Λ
S
i
∂ti =
k
dS
³
(1− ti)g
00
i e
∂vi
∂ti − g
0
ie− (1− tj)g
00
j e
∂vj
∂ti
´
.
Because g
00
j < 0 and
∂vj
∂ti > 0 (part (2) of Lemma 6),
∂Wi|αi=0
∂ti <
dS
k
∂ΛSi
∂ti . Hence
∂ΛSi
∂ti < 0 (part (3) of Lemma 6) implies
∂Wi|αi=0
∂ti < 0, which proves the claim. Similar
arguments can be made for the case of the lump-sum taxes.
We have studied the model with two extreme cases. Computation of the equilib-
rium tax rate in the intermediate cases is straightforward. If αi is sufficiently large,
we have similar results like Theorems 5 and 7. If αi is sufficiently small, we have
the result like Theorem 9.
4 Conclusion
Our results here show that the equilibrium tax rate is not always driven down to
zero when the mobility of two factors are considered simultaneously and wages are
endogenously determined. The problem of tax competition can be more broadly
seen as a cross-border fiscal externality problem. The externality occurs because an
increase (a decrease) in the tax rate in one jurisdiction causes an outflow (inflow) of a
production factor to other jurisdictions that increases (decreases) their tax revenues.
(See Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Wildasin (1989) for further discussion.)
When both factors move simultaneously and wages are endogenously determined,
however, the externality problem is less severe because a tax-cutting country imposes
not only a negative externality to the other country by decreasing the latter’s number
of tax base but also a positive externality by increasing the per-capita income of the
tax base.
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